Which Term Refers To The Drawing Of Political Boundaries To Benefit A Party Or Candidate?

Equal population

The U.S. Constitution requires that each district have nigh the aforementioned population: each federal district within a state must have nigh the same number of people, each state commune within a state must have about the same number of people, and each local district inside its jurisdiction must accept well-nigh the same number of people.

• Congressional districts. The standard for congressional districts allows relatively minor deviations, when deployed in the service of legitimate objectives.  States must make a adept-faith effort to draw districts with the same number of people in each commune within the state, and any district with more or fewer people than the average must be justified past a consistent state policy.  Just consistent policies that leave a relatively minor spread from largest to smallest district will probable be ramble.  In 2022, for example, the Supreme Courtroom canonical a congressional plan in West Virginia with 0.79% population variation based on keeping county lines intact.

These population counts are calculated based on the full number of people in each country, including children, noncitizens, and others non eligible to vote.  After the Civil War, nosotros amended the Constitution to ensure that each and every individual nowadays in the country would be represented in federal districts.  On July 21, 2022, President Trump purported to suggest that he had the authority to exclude undocumented individuals from the census count — if valid, that would have affected non merely how many districts the states got, but how those districts were divided inside a state.  Litigation over the issue striking procedural hurdles as it was unclear whether the information would be fix in time for President Trump to make the determination he'd flagged; ultimately, the data were delayed long plenty for the Biden Assistants to reverse course.  As in prior decades, the Census counts will include everyone for purposes of circulation.

• State and local legislative districts take a chip more flexibility on the numbers; they have to be "essentially" equal. Over a serial of cases, it has get accepted that a programme will be constitutionally suspect if the largest and smallest districts are more x percent apart. This is non a hard line: a state plan may exist upheld if there is a compelling reason for a larger disparity, and a land programme may be struck downwardly if a smaller disparity is not justified by a good reason.

Some states concord their state districts to stricter population equality limits than the federal constitution requires. Colorado, for case, allows at about five pct full divergence betwixt the largest and smallest districts; Missouri asks districts to exist no more than one percent to a higher place or below the average, except that deviations of up to three percent are permitted to maintain political boundaries. Iowa both limits the total population deviation to five percent, and likewise sets the overall average deviation at no more than than one percent.

Equally far aswho is counted for purpose of equalizing state and local districts, the Supreme Court has been less definitive nearly what the Constitution requires. In 2022, each and every state counted the total population.  Simply some have suggested other measures, including voting-age population ("VAP"), citizen voting-age population ("CVAP"), or registered voters. Each of these alternatives depends on a logic of exclusion, denying representation to those who pay taxes and who are expected to live by our laws.  Though the Supreme Court has formally left this question for a hereafter case, their terminal word in the area left serious question equally to whether such measures would be constitutional.

Minority representation

The other set of major federal redistricting rules concerns race and ethnicity.  The extent to which redistricting can or must account for race and ethnicity is sometimes seen as a particularly thorny problem, but that's in function because some people have a vested interest in making it seem hard.  Race relations and electoral politics are both quite complicated.  But the law on race and ethnicity in the redistricting context essentially boils downwardly to 3 concepts.  And while there are without question some complications in the details — including some hurdles for challengers trying to challenge maps in court — the overview for those cartoon the lines is pretty straightforward.

1. Don't depict lines that ready out to harm voters based on their race or ethnicity.
2. Where bigotry plays or has played a significant role, and where voting is substantially polarized along racial or indigenous lines, look at balloter patterns and decide whether minorities already have proportionate electoral power. If not, the Voting Rights Act might require a change to the lines to give a compact and sizable minority community equitable balloter opportunity they practise non currently enjoy.
3. When considering race in cartoon districts, whether to satisfy the Voting Rights Human activity or otherwise, consider other factors in the mix every bit well.

• Intentional discrimination. For more than 100 years, the Constitution has prohibited intentional government efforts to treat similarly situated people worse than others, because of their race or ethnicity.  In redistricting, one ploy is called "cracking": splintering minority populations into small pieces across several districts, so that a large grouping ends up with a very piffling hazard to affect any single election. Another tactic is chosen "packing": pushing as many minority voters as possible into a few super-concentrated districts, and draining the population's voting power from anywhere else. Other tactics grow.  And they have been used with disappointing frequency.Redistricting legislation unremarkably simply describes which census blocks autumn in which districts, or which streets district lines follow: zilch in a redistricting statute looks like it has anything to do with race.  Only if the line-drawers intentionally drew the lines to impairment residents specifically considering of their race, that's nigh always illegal.
  
  That remains true no matter the underlying motive for the discrimination.  Sometimes, the reason for intentional discrimination is old-fashioned hatred or stereotype.  But singling out racial minorities for worse treatment because of the candidates or parties they prefer all the same involves singling out racial minorities for worse handling.  And information technology nonetheless invites peculiarly close scrutiny under the constitution.

• Voting Rights Act.  The federal Voting Rights Human action of 1965 was designed to combat tactics denying minorities the right to an effective vote, including redistricting techniques like those higher up. As federal law, the Voting Rights Human activity overrides inconsistent state laws, just similar the constitutional equal population rule overrides other land laws.From 1965-2013, the Voting Rights Human action had an especially powerful provision targeting the jurisdictions with the worst history of discrimination.  In these areas, the Voting Rights Human action required every change in election rules to be run by the Department of Justice or a federal courtroom before they took upshot, stopping discrimination before it had the chance to work.  In 2006, Congress concluding revisited the part of the statute designating which jurisdictions should be covered.  Only in 2022, the Supreme Court decided in Shelby County five. Holder that this 2006 renewal was non sufficiently tied to current conditions; their decision hitting down the coerage provision essentially left no jurisdictions covered.  In 2022, the House of Representatives passed a new coverage provision, but information technology did not go on through the Senate.After Shelby Canton, the most powerful remaining provision of the Voting Rights Deed is Section 2 of the Human action, which blocks district lines that deny minority voters an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their pick." It applies whether the denial is intentional, or an unintended end result. Courts substantially examination whether the way that districts are drawn takes decisive political power abroad from a cohesive minority bloc otherwise at adventure for discrimination.

  There are three threshold weather for a court finding that districts need to be redrawn because section ii has been violated. (These are often called Gingles conditions, subsequently the Supreme court'sThornburg v. Gingles instance.)

  The beginning asks whether information technology is possible to draw a district and so that a bulk of voters belong to a geographically "meaty" racial, ethnic, or language minority customs. Compactness has never been precisely defined in this context, but generally refers to populations that are not particularly "far-flung," and where the boundaries are fairly regular, without extensive tendrils. This kickoffGingles status basically tests whether a sufficiently large minority population is geographically distributed so that they could control a reasonable district.

  The 2ndGingles condition tests whether the minority population normally votes as a bloc, for the same type of candidate. This is a nuanced test: not whether the customs usually votes for Democrats or Republicans (or others), but whether they would, given a fair mix of candidates, vote for the sametype of Democrats or Republicans (or others).

  The thirdGingles condition tests the potential competition: whether the balance of the population in the area usually votes as a bloc for different candidates than those preferred by the minority community. If and then, this would mean that the minority's preferred candidate would near always lose — if the minority community's voting ability were non specifically protected. Together, the second and 3rd conditions are known generally as "racially polarized" voting.

  If the three threshold weather higher up accept been met, courts then look to the "totality of the circumstances" to decide whether the minority vote has been diluted, drawing from the U.S. Senate's legislative written report when the Voting Rights Human action was passed. Most of these circumstances chronicle to the extent of historical or contextual discrimination. I cistron that has been singled out as particularly important is rough proportionality: whether minorities have the opportunity to elect representatives of their choice in a number of districts roughly proportional to the per centum of minority voters in the population as a whole. Section two does not guarantee proportionality. Only if a minority grouping with xx% of a land's eligible population could already elect representatives in twenty% of the land'south districts, courts will be more hesitant to find a violation of section 2 fifty-fifty if the 3Gingles conditions are met. And if the minority group does not have such an opportunity, courts will often exist more decumbent to find a violation.Courts take largely articulated Section 2'south pregnant after plans have been fatigued and challenged, so the tests above are framed retroactively. For those drawing the lines and seeking to avoid legal problem, the usual technique involves protecting substantial minority populations in racially polarized areas, by drawing district lines so that those minorities take the functional opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.

• Considering other factors. The Supreme Courtroom has also said that the Constitution requires information technology to look skeptically at redistricting plans when race or ethnicity is the "predominant" reason for putting a pregnant number of people in or out of a district.  This does not mean that race can't be considered, or that when districts drawn primarily based on race are invalid.  Information technology means that there has to exist a actually skillful reason for subordinating all other districting considerations to race. (And the Courtroom has also repeatedly implied that 1 such compelling reason is compliance with the federal Voting Rights Human action.)In do, this means that those cartoon the lines attempt non to let racial considerations "predominate," by considering other factors at the same time.  This is not terribly difficult; there are lots of other considerations that go into deciding where to describe a detail commune line, like the residential clustering of groups of voters with common interests, or the locations of municipal boundaries or physical geographic features, or the desire to continue a district relatively close together.It may be useful to retrieve of this rule like well-nigh of u.s.a. think about driving a car.  It's important to proceed to the speed limit.  If you obsess over your speed, and stare only at the speedometer, subordinating every other stimulus, you're likely to crash.  Only if you pay attention to the route, and surrounding traffic, and the directions to your destination, and signaling when yous change lanes, and the car temperature, and the corporeality of gas you've got left, and the atmospheric condition, and the music on the radio — and likewise check in on your speed from fourth dimension to fourth dimension — and then your attention to the speed doesn't "predominate."

Contiguity

Contiguity is the most common rule imposed by u.s.a.: by country constitution or statute, 45 states require at least ane chamber'southward state legislative districts to be face-to-face. 18 states have similarly alleged that their congressional districts will be contiguous. (The smaller number reflects the fact that few states have any express legal constraints on congressional districting. In do, the vast bulk of congressional districts — perhaps every one in the 2022 cycle — will be drawn to be contiguous.)

A district is contiguous if you can travel from whatsoever point in the district to any other point in the commune without crossing the district'south boundary. Put differently, all portions of the district are physically adjacent. Virtually states require portions of a commune to exist connected by more than a single betoken, only don't further require that a district be continued by territory of a certain expanse.

Few redistricting concepts are absolute, and contiguity is no exception. Many states require contiguity merely "to the extent possible," and courts generally accept anomalies that otherwise seem reasonable in context. For instance, the city of Racine, Wisconsin, has a non-contiguous purlieus (boundaries like this are fairly common by-products of annexation). And so, in 2001, the legislature drew Wisconsin's 61st state assembly district to incorporate most of the city of Racine — with a noncontiguous portion of the district embracing the noncontiguous portion of the urban center.  In 2022, Wisconsin's 47th country assembly district did much the same for the noncontiguous portions of Blooming Grove and several other noncontiguous wards, and the 60th country associates district did the same for the noncontiguous portions of Cedarburg.

Water also gets special treatment for contiguity. In nigh cases, districts divided by water are contiguous if a common means of transport (like a bridge or ferry route) connects the two sides of the district. Island districts are generally face-to-face every bit long equally the isle is part of the aforementioned district as the mainland area closest to the island or near tied to the island past these sorts of ship routes. In Hawaii, where there is no mainland to consider, the state constitution prohibits the drawing of "canoe districts" — districts that are spread across more one major isle group, where information technology is necessary to employ a "canoe" to travel betwixt different parts of the district.

Political boundaries

The next nigh common state rule is a requirement to follow political boundaries, like canton, city, town, or ward lines, when drawing districts. Past country constitution or statute, 34 states require state legislative districts to show some accounting for political boundaries; 15 states impose like constraints on congressional districts. Most often, country law concerning political boundaries leaves a fair amount of flexibility in the mandate — i common pedagogy is to keep to political boundaries "to the extent practicable." And like all other country redistricting law, this rule must bend where necessary to federal equal population or Voting Rights Act constraints.

Information technology is worth remembering that some cities or towns spill over county lines; even though counties are usually bigger than cities, keeping strictly to county lines may hateful cutting off pieces of these "spillover" cities or metropolitan areas.

Likewise, if counties or cities have to be split to comply with other redistricting requirements, most state law does not specify whether information technology is amend to minimize the number of jurisdictions that are split, or to minimize the number of times that a given jurisdiction is divide. The quondam might mean splitting a few jurisdictions into many pieces; the latter might mean splitting a greater number of jurisdictions, but into fewer pieces.  (As an exception to the general flexibility, Ohio has a rather detailed fix of constraints describing how counties and other municipalities are to be carve up if they have to be split at all.)

Compactness

Almost as often as state police force asks districts to follow political boundaries, it asks that districts be "compact."  By constitution or statute, 32 states crave their legislative districts to be reasonably compact; 17 states require congressional districts to be compact as well.

Few states define precisely what "compactness" means, but a district in which people generally alive near each other is normally more compact than one in which they do not. Nigh observers look to measures of a district's geometric shape. In California, districts are compact when they do not featherbed nearby population for people further away. In the Voting Rights Act context, the Supreme Court seems to take construed compactness to bespeak that residents take some sort of cultural cohesion in common.

Scholars have proposed more than 30 measures of compactness, each of which tin be applied in unlike ways to individual districts or to a programme as a whole. These mostly fit into three categories. In the first category,contorted boundaries are most important: a district with smoother boundaries volition be more compact, and one with more squiggly boundaries will be less compact. In the 2d category, the caste to which the district spreads from a key core (called "dispersion") is most important: a commune with few pieces sticking out from the centre will exist more meaty, and one with pieces sticking out farther from the commune's middle volition be less compact. In the third category, the relationship ofhousing patterns to the district'southward boundaries is nearly of import: district tendrils, for example, are less meaningful in sparsely populated areas but more meaningful where the population is densely packed.

In practise, compactness tends to exist in the heart of the beholder. Idaho, for example, says that its redistricting commission "should avert drawing districts that are oddly shaped" — which is more specific than about states. Only 7 states appear to specify a item measure of compactness: Arizona and Colorado focus on contorted boundaries; California, Michigan, Missouri, and Montana focus on dispersion, though in unlike ways; and Iowa embraces both.

Communities of interest

Preserving "communities of interest" is some other common criterion reflected in country constabulary.  Past constitution or statute, 15 states consider keeping "communities of interest" whole when drawing land legislative districts; 11 states do the same for congressional districts.

A "community of interest" is just a group of people with a common involvement (normally, a common interest that legislation might benefit). Kansas' 2002 guidelines offered a fairly typical definition: "[south]ocial, cultural, racial, ethnic, and economical interests common to the population of the area, which are probable subjects of legislation."

Several of the other principles higher up may exist seen every bit proxies for recognizing crude communities of interest. For example, a requirement to follow canton boundaries may be based on an assumption that citizens inside a canton share some mutual interests relevant to legislative representation. Similarly, a compactness requirement may be based on a similar assumption that people who live close to each other have shared legislative ends. Just each of these proxies may also exist imperfect: people with common interests don't generally wait to geometric shapes — or fifty-fifty strict political lines — when they consider where they want to live. Considering communities of interest direct is a way to step past the proxy.

Partisan outcomes

Most scholarly and popular attention to redistricting has to practice with the partisan effect of the process, though partisan impacts are hardly the simply salient impacts.

The federal constitution puts few practical limits on redistricting bodies. Individual districts can exist drawn to favor or disfavor candidates of a certain party, or individual incumbents or challengers (indeed, the Court has explicitly blessed lines drawn to protect incumbents, and fifty-fifty those drawn for a niggling bit of partisan advantage).  As for the district plan as a whole, the Supreme Court has unanimously stated that excessive partisanship in the process is unconstitutional, but the Courtroom has also said that federal courts cannot hear claims of undue partisanship because of an disability to make up one's mind how much is "too much."

State law, however, increasingly restricts undue partisanship.  In 2022, just eight states direct regulated partisan outcomes in the redistricting process (equally opposed to attempting to accomplish compromise or balance through the structure of the redistricting body); at present, the constitutions or statutes of nineteen states speak to the consequence for state legislative districts, and 17 states do the same for congressional districts.

Nearly of these state-law provisions prohibit "unduly" favoring (or disfavoring) a candidate or political political party, which might include both intent and effect; some, like Florida, specify that the intent to favor or disfavor is impermissible.  Ohio's law specifies that the state legislative plan, as a whole, may not be fatigued "primarily" to favor or aversion a party, and separately specifies that the plan's overal partisan district alignment should "correspond closely" to statewide partisan preferences.  And both Rhode Island and Washington provisions speak in terms of fair and effective representation, just without much construction past state courts to give farther meaning.

Arizona, Colorado, and Washington are the but states that affirmatively encourage districts that are competitive in a general election, in slightly different ways; in each example, this is a goal to be implemented but when doing then would not backbite from other state priorities.  New York prohibits discouraging competition, which is slightly different.  And Missouri purports to plant a construction for both crude partisan equity and contest, though its detail implementation of the terms amounts to negligible constraint in practice.

Arizona, California, Iowa, and Idaho ban considering an incumbent's home address when cartoon district lines; many of the same states as well limit the use of further political information like partisan registration or voting history. Note: where minority populations present the possibility of obligations under the Voting Rights Act, those cartoon the lines may take to consider partisan voter history to assess racial polarization, no affair what state law provides. Likewise, information technology is important to think that every determination to draw district lines in one place or another has a political issue; lines drawn without looking at underlying voting data can be only as politically skewed as lines drawn with the data in heed.

Other land rules

There are three other notable structural rules that, in some states, govern the location of district lines.

• The first is a "nesting" requirement. In states where districts are "nested," the districts of the state Senate are constructed past combining two or iii state House or Associates districts (or the districts of the state House or Assembly are synthetic past dividing up each state Senate district). In contrast, without nesting, the districts of each legislative house are independent; they may follow the same purlieus lines, but they don't have to. In eighteen states, land police force asks that the lower and upper legislative firm districts exist nested where possible; of these states, in California, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Utah, the law amounts to crude preference rather than mandate.
• The 2nd rule concerns districts where 2, 3, or more representatives are elected from the same district; these are called "multi-fellow member" districts. Since 1842, federal law has prohibited multi-member districts for Congress, just many local legislatures still elect several representatives from a unmarried district. In the state legislature, Arizona, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington elect all lower business firm members from multi-member districts; 9 other states expressly authorize the use of one or more multi-fellow member districts. In some instances, multi-member districts may be used together with nesting rules; in Arizona, for example, each district elects one state senator and two country representatives. In other cases (like W Virginia), multi-fellow member districts for one legislative chamber are not tied to the districts of the other chamber: a Senate district and a multi-member Assembly district are entirely unrelated. Multi-member districts in which each representative is elected by majority vote may heighten concerns nether the Voting Rights Act, though such concerns tin be alleviated through some alternative voting rules.
• The third dominion of note is the "floterial" commune: a district that wholly or partially overlaps other districts in the same legislative chamber. Florida, Mississippi, and New Hampshire expressly permit floterial districts. Virtually floterial districts arose as a manner to preserve political boundaries while also limiting astringent population disparities. Imagine a state where the average commune'due south population is 100, just there are two side by side towns with 150 people each. One way to ensure equal population is to separate the towns so that there are three mutually exclusive districts with 100 people each. An alternative is to create one district serving each town, and one "floterial district" elected by the 300 people in both towns together, so that the 300 people have the aforementioned 3 total representatives.

Source: https://redistricting.lls.edu/redistricting-101/where-are-the-lines-drawn/

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